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Interest Rate Ceilings for Microfinance
Megan Whittaker*
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of microcredit, in which poor people are given access to
small loans as an alternative to charity, began as an economic and social
experiment in the developing world. Microlending was pioneered by
Bangladeshi Professor Muhammad Yunus in 1976, when he launched an
action research project in his native country to "examine the possibility of
designing a credit delivery system to provide banking services targeted at
the rural poor."
2
As of December 2007, the product that resulted from Yunus' research
project, the Grameen Bank, has 7.41 million borrowers, ninety-seven
percent of whom are women. 3 The Bank has 2259 branches serving 72,833
villages, covering more than ninety-six percent of the total villages in
Bangladesh.4
The success of the Grameen Bank has been duplicated in various other
countries by various other microfinance institutions ("MFIs"). Indeed,
loans to the poor have existed for thousands of years, albeit in less
formalized models.5  The movement has advanced from the collective
insights of numerous "extraordinary individuals," and today there are
thousands of financial institutions around the world providing the very poor
* J.D. Candidate, 2008, Northwestern University School of Law. Thank you to my family
for their love and support, and to Professor Stephen Sawyer for his insight and assistance
with this comment.
1 Jay Lee, Note, Equity and Innovation: Using Traditional Islamic Banking to
Reinvigorate Microlending in Urban America, 16 IND. INT'L & COMp. L. REV. 523, 523
(2006).
2 A Short History of Grameen Bank, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/hist.html (last
visited May 1, 2008).
3 Grameen Bank, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/index.html (last visited May 1,
2008).
4 Id.
5 Macro Credit, ECONOMIST, Oct. 21, 2006, at 78, available at http://www.economist
.com/people/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E I_RDQJRNJ.
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with access to financial services.6 Since the idea's inception in the 1970s,
the Grameen Bank and other microfinance institutions have "reversed
conventional banking practice by removing the need for collateral and
created a banking system based on mutual trust, accountability,
participation and creativity."
7
Indeed, microfinance has evolved into a highly-regarded anti-poverty
mechanism. The UN itself has placed significant faith in microfinance by
implementing it in its strategy to "halv[e] extreme povert' and hunger by
2015." It made 2005 the International Year of Microcredit. Former United
Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan has stated that access to credit
"helps alleviate poverty by generating income, creating jobs, allowing
children to go to school, enabling families to obtain health care and
empowering people to make the choices that best serve their needs." 9 Most
recently, Mohammed Yunus was honored with the Nobel Peace Prize in
October 2006.'°
The emotional appeal of microcredit is undeniable; its success could
make it "one of the great humanitarian movements of history, allowing
people to free themselves from the bondage of poverty."'" It provides
investors of all financial backgrounds with a means of helping alleviate
poverty by expressing faith in the work ethic and entrepreneurial
capabilities of the world's poorest people.
The benefits of microcredit, however, are not merely sentimental.
Historically, microlending has led to high return rates across a variety of
cultures and contexts.' 2 Due to the extensive effort and gradual return
involved in a single microloan, personal investment in a microfinance
institution is not a way to accumulate rapid sums of wealth.13 With an
average return of four percent, however, it "outperforms money market
accounts and is safer than the market."' 1
4
As a result, the concept of microloans has been met with both heavy
caution and enthusiastic optimism. The possibilities behind microfinance,
both social and economic, have attracted significant study of the forces
behind it in an attempt to harness the optimal benefits from such a
6 id.
7 Grameen Bank, supra note 3.
8 id.
9 Lee, supra note 1, at 524.
10 Celia W. Dugger, Peace Prize to Pioneer of Loans For Those Too Poor to Borrow,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2006, at Al.
11 Lee, supra note 1, at 533.
12 See generally Tom Easton, A Survey on Microfinance. Micro No More, ECONOMIST,
Nov. 5, 2005, available at http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfn?storyid=
EIVDSJPNQ.
13 Lee, supra note 1, at 534.
14 Id.
562
South Africa's National Credit Act
28:561 (2008)
potentially powerful anti-poverty mechanism.
This comment will discuss the current debate regarding the proper role
of interest rate ceilings in microfinance and how the South African National
Credit Act should serve as a model for future studies of microcredit systems
in developing countries. Part II will discuss the controversy over interest
rate ceilings in microfinance, setting concerns regarding the effect of
ceilings on the viability of microfinance institutions against the need to
protect marginalized consumers from predatory lending. Part III will
analyze various alternatives to usury laws that microfinance experts have
proposed, with an emphasis on supervisory and regulatory systems as the
most promising option. Part IV will discuss South Africa's National Credit
Act of 2005, a sophisticated supervisory and regulatory system which the
South African government enacted as a response to decades of ineffective
policies regarding usury laws. The comment concludes by explaining how
the new South African model attempts to resolve many of the issues
expressed in Parts II and III, and if successful, may provide a critical
example of how interest rate ceilings and microfinance can co-exist in a
symbiotic relationship.
II. THE CONTROVERSY OVER INTEREST RATE CEILINGS IN
MICROFINANCE
As with any credit system, and especially a developmental one, there
remains controversy over the proper interest rates to be applied to such
loans. Superficially, one would expect that with a target population of
impoverished clients, the lower the interest rate, the better. There is,
however, considerable debate in the microfinance world about the role of
interest rate ceilings in microlending.
The Consultative Group for Assisting the Poor ("CGAP"), a
consortium of thirty-three public and private development agencies,
believes that usury rates are a hindrance to the survival of MFIs, and often
to the developing economy altogether. 15 For example, when the purpose of
microfinance is to give credit access to those who would not normally be
able to obtain it, the goal would be to extend that access to as many
consumers as possible. The costs of microcredit are higher than in regular
consumer banking, however, and therefore MFIs generally have to charge
higher rates than consumer banks in order to cover those costs and retain
enough profit to sustain themselves.' 6 This is due not to poor return rates,
but instead to the inherent nature of microfinance; the transactional costs
15 CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR, OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 9: INTEREST RATE
CEILINGS AND MICROFINANCE: THE STORY So FAR (Sept. 2004), available at
http://www.cgap.org/portal/site/CGAP/menuitem.1b5d17lad6c9e30167808010591010a0/
[hereinafter OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 9].
1 Id. at 2.
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involved in making many small loans will always be larger than those
required to make one big loan.
17
A. Transactional Costs
Typically, there are three types of lending costs that need to be covered
by interest rates: costs of funds for on-lending, the cost of risk (loan loss),
and administrative costs. 18 These costs are compounded by the personal
contact with consumers, often in the form of lending agents visiting clients
in remote villages, which forms an integral part of the microcredit process.' 
9
Nevertheless, although the transactional costs are usually proportionally
higher for microcredit than for mainstream commercial bank lending,
microfinance institutions often are more productive than commercial banks
in that microfinance boasts a much higher borrower-per-loan officer ratio.2 °
Unfortunately, the government entities that create interest rate ceilings
and usury laws are often composed of politicians, not financial experts, and
often do not consider adequately those practical (and often unavoidable)
differences in their calculations. 21 According to the CGAP, the reference
point is instead "nearly always the lower-cost commercial banking sector,
which makes larger loans than the microfinance sector. This decision-
making process means that in many cases governments find it politically
difficult to set interest rate ceilings high enough for microfinance to
flourish. '22
Moreover, enforcement of these laws is usually not sufficiently
addressed. Many usury laws are enacted without a clear means of
23implementation. Other times, the responsibility is placed in the hands of
an agency without either adequate expertise or the enforcement capacity
required to regulate the large numbers of non-bank institutions and even
individuals that should fall under its jurisdiction.24
As a result, usury laws that cap interest rates often reduce the
profitability of loans and undermine one of the main goals of microlending
by "making it more of a charity than a commercial enterprise. 25  If a
microfinance institution cannot cover the costs of its current operations, it
will either reduce access to few loan recipients or go out of business
17 Id. at 3.
18 id.
19 Id.
20 OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 9, supra note 15, at 3.
21 Id. at 9.
22 Id. at 5.
23 Id. at 9.
24 Id.
25 Tom Easton, A Survey on Microfinance: Bankable Banks, ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 2005, at
8.
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altogether. 26 Interest rate ceilings may discourage NGOs from transforming
into licensed financial intermediaries, or discourage already licensed firms
from entering into the microfinance market. 7
B. Regulation Evasion and Its Effect on Consumers
Alternatively, usury laws may encourage existing participants in the
microfinance sector to evade regulation.2 8 For example, some MFIs avoid
raising interest rates by adding confusing fees that reduce the poor's ability
to choose between competitive institutions and programs.2 Moreover,
some MFIs that are unable to cover costs with the maximum interest rate
are forced to accept government subsidies, which render the institutions
vulnerable to political agendas, instability, and corruption.3 °
C. Cultural Barriers to Usury Laws
Finally, some societies, notably many Islamic countries, prohibit usury
laws altogether as a matter of culture. Although Islamic banking is beyond
the scope of this comment, most devout Muslims accept the interpretation
of the Koran that forbids a fixed rate of interest on loans or deposits.3'
Instead, the basic principle is that of "shared risk"-Muslims generally
believe that it is immoral for the risks and benefits of a loan or an
investment not to be shared equitably by all participants.32 Although the
concept of "shared risk" is similar to many microfinance programs, the
discrete issue of usury laws as a supplement to group loans is closed within
many Islamic economies.33
D. Benefits to Usury Laws
The debate regarding usury laws, however, is not completely one-
sided. The fears of predatory lending are not without merit. There is no
shortage of egregious interest rates that leave 3oor consumers in enormous
debt, even to the point of de facto servitude. In India, some MFIs have
behaved more like loansharks than ethical enterprisers, charging interest
rates on the full amount of a loan instead of the declining balance, and
26 OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 9, supra note 15, at 5.
27 Id.
28 Easton, supra note 12, at 9.
29 OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 9, supra note 15, at 6-7.
30 See, e.g., id. at 4-5.
31 Lee, supra note 1, at 550.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Microsharks, ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 2006, available at http://www.economist.com
/finance/displaystory.cfm?story-id=780363 1.
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bullying and humiliating consumers.35 Even the CGAP has admitted that
"[a]t the same time, predatory lending and consumer abuses are legitimate
policy concerns. 36
Furthermore, the arguments for simply repealing usury laws seem to
rest on several assumptions. Countries with liberalized interest rates rely on
the combination of interest rate disclosure and lender competition to
promote fair rates over time.37 Developing countries are the main target of
microfinance institutions, so to assume that their economies will be able to
support limitless interest rates effectively is a practically dangerous
exercise. Many states will not have the luxury of transparent consumer
protection laws and efficient market economies. Nor may they have
enforcement capabilities to place any weight behind mechanisms created
with the ambition to replace a need for usury laws. Nevertheless, critics of
interest rate ceilings have proposed alternatives to usury laws, the practical
implications of which will be discussed below.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO USURY LAWS
The main alternatives that critics of usury laws suggest are
competition, consumer protection laws, and supervisory and regulatory
mechanisms. Despite their theoretical appeal, competition and consumer
protection laws are ineffective by themselves due to their inherent reliance
on other measures of economic and institutional health that cannot be
assumed in a developing country. Supervisory and regulatory mechanisms,
on the other hand, build up those strengths rather than take them for
granted, and thus enjoy the greatest potential for success as an alternative to
traditional usury laws.
A. Competition
Organizations such as the CGAP have stated that "[t]he most powerful
mechanism for lowering interest rates in microfinance is competition.', 38 In
support of this position, they claim that "[i]n many competitive markets,
efficiency has improved and microcredit interest rates have declined., 3
9
The argument that competition is a cure-all is misleading, however,
since competition itself relies on numerous other factors in order to work
efficiently. In its Occasional Paper No. 9, the CGAP also states that "[f]irst
and foremost, a stable macroeconomic situation is a critical precondition for
competitive microfinance. Also important is an appropriate legal and
35 id.
36 OCCASIONAL PAPER No. 9, supra note 15, at 10.
37 See generally id.
" Id. at 11.
39 Id.
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regulatory framework that provides a level playing field, allowing for
market entry and a reasonable operating environment for diverse types of
financial institutions. ' 40 And it does not stop there, since "[i]nvestments in
basic telecommunications, roads, and education are also critical for future
efficiency improvements in microfinance."
4 1
There is no doubt that all these variables are important. Nevertheless,
since microfinance sectors have erupted mostly in developing countries,
many societies that currently have microfinance sectors may not have the
resources at this point to have all of these pre-conditions in place.
Without these pre-conditions, competition itself can eventually hurt the
poor, "as competition exacerbates asymmetric information problems over
borrower indebtedness. 42  As a result, many borrowers may find
themselves with multiple loans from different MFIs.43 In India, for
example, a high suicide rate among borrowers was attributed to
"[a]ggressive competition and a failure to share information" which "meant
some people were in hock to numerous lenders." 4 Therefore, competition
by itself is not an adequate alternative to usury laws.
B. Consumer Protection Laws
The CGAP has also claimed that enhanced consumer protection laws,
such as truth-in-lending laws, can be "a more constructive alternative" to
usury laws.45 Consumer protection laws can give borrowers the assurance
that the information they are receiving regarding loan rates and other
applicable fees are both comparable and accurate, and thus allow the
borrower to make an informed decision before entering into a credit
agreement.46 The CGAP has noted that "[a]n important goal of consumer
protection is to protect consumers from exorbitant fees and interest rates.7
However, it would seem that consumer protection laws would face the
same enforcement challenges as usury laws, as both would require a
competent and authoritative mechanism to implement remedies for
violations. Furthermore, although one of the criticisms of having
40 Id. at 12.
41 id.




44 Microsharks, supra note 34.
41 CONSULATIVE GROUP FOR ASSISTING THE POOR, Focus NOTE 27: PROTECTING
MICROFINANCE BORROWERS 1 (May 2005), available at http://www.microfinancegateway
.org/content/article/detail/26287 [hereinafter Focus NOTE 27].
46 Id.
4 7 Id. at 4.
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politicians decide which rates are "usurious" is their lack of technical
expertise, consumer protection laws that require courts to enforce these
laws would be reserving such decisions for judges, who are presumably no
more qualified than politicians to make decisions based on economic (as
opposed to legal) principles.
C. Supervisory and Regulatory Systems
The most promising alternatives to traditional usury laws may involve
supervisory and regulatory systems. After conducting research in Bolivia,
Colombia, and Mexico, Accion International, one of the major microfinance
organizations, stated that "we consider a supervisory and regulatory system
to be successful for microfinance if it allows microfinance to evolve and
become integrated into the mainstream financial sector while appropriately
protecting both deposit taking MFIs and consumers against risk.
48
For example, in Bolivia, competition "engendered by the entry of new
players and the growth of the microfinance industry" pushed interest rates
from roughly eighty percent in the early 1990s down to levels of between
twenty-two and thirty percent "without regulatory pressure from the
banking authorities and without unsustainable subsidization of interest rates
by the public sector., 49 However, this drop in interest rates occurred only
within a larger supervisory and regulatory system.5°
Accion claimed that several factors can contribute to good
microfinance regulation and supervision. First, "a successful system will be
tailored to the needs of the microfinance industry in each specific
country. 51 Instead of a "one-size fits-all" approach when developing or
restructuring their systems, governments should consider the unique
microfinance environment that currently exists within their own country,
while keeping in mind the specific performance norms applicable to
microfinance.
For example, in its analysis, Accion emphasized that Bolivia had
created "a system of specialized microfinance regulation and supervision,"
whereas Mexico had initiated "a delegated system in which federations
comprised of representatives from MFIs engage in self-regulation.,
53
However, any system that is implemented within a country's economy
48 JACQUES TRIGO LouBI3IRE ET AL., SUPERVISING AND REGULATING MICROFNANCE IN THE
CONTEXT OF FINANCIAL SECTOR LIBERALIZATION: LESSONS FROM BOLIVIA, COLOMBIA AND
MEXICO 10 (Aug. 2004), available at http://publications.accion.org/publications/Supervisin
_1 84.asp.
49 id. at 8.
50 id.
"' Id. at 10.
52 Id.
53 Id.
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needs to be adapted to characteristics of microfinance and "aligned with the
local realities of the microfinance industry" in order to foster MFI growth.54
Second, "governments should engage in a consultative process to
arrive at a well-designed system that provides the basis for growth and
development of a healthy industry., 55 According to Accion, officials should
solicit the advice of all local stakeholders (e.g., microfinance institutions,
other government officials and associations) as well as international experts
when designing their systems.56
Furthermore, the country must have a "suitable" political and
microfinance climate.57  This means that "a critical mass" of existing
microfinance providers should already be operating, and that supervisors
assigned to the sector should have a deep understanding of the credit
technologies specific to microfinance. 58 Finally, there should be "stable,
high-level political support for the microfinance industry." 59 As will be
discussed below, South Africa has created by new legislation a supervisory
and regulatory system that meets most, if not all, of Accion's requirements
for success.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW NATIONAL CREDIT ACT IN
SOUTH AFRICA
Microfinance institutions have entered the economies of developing
countries all over the world. Reports have been done on the success rates of
both the institutions and the role of interest rate ceilings on the viability of
those institutions. 60  Each context, however, represents a society at a
different level of development, with a different government and a different
set of cultural values. Finding a cookie-cutter model for microfinance,
therefore, is most likely a futile exercise. However, some models may be
analyzed to determine which mechanisms pose the greatest chance for
success in a similar context.
The current South African model, with its parameters arising from
extensive experience in the microfinance sector, provides a promising
example of the integration of microfinance sector into a developing society.
A. History of the National Credit Act
South Africa's first attempt at usury legislation was the Usury Act of
54 LOUBItRE ET AL., supra note 48, at 10.
5 Id. at 10-11.




60 See, e.g., LOUBItRE ET AL., supra note 48, at 10.
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1968. This legislation was implemented in the era of apartheid, and
therefore faced significant issues regarding the financial exclusion of its
non-white citizens, most notably the country's black majority population.6 1
In 1992, the Ministry of Trade instituted a Usury Act Exemption,
which allowed lenders to charge unregulated interest on small loans. 6 The
stated policy goal of this legislation was to spur growth in lending to micro,
small, and medium-sized enterprises. 63 As a result, the microloan sector
soon exploded, but the effects were not felt by the intended recipients.
Instead of improving credit access to poor, rural South Africans, the
microlending sector targeted urban, employed individuals for loans.64 The
policy created a disaster by "dividing the market and thereby excluding
lower income people from the banking sector and formal credit options. 'A
Interest controls were removed without proper regulatory oversight and
credit protections. 66 By the mid-1990s, the Minister of Trade and Industry,
Alec Erwin, observed that poor and low-income South Africans were being
charged unreasonably high interest rates, and Mr. Erwin threatened to
revoke the 1992 Exemption altogether.67
After five years of dialogue between the industry and the government,
the Ministry formed the Microfinance Regulatory Commission ("MFRC")
in 1999.68 The MFRC changed the process of receiving exemptions, largely
in response to widespread concern about high interest rates and abusive
practices in the "cowboy" microlending market.69  Instead of generally
removing interest ceilings for MFIs, the MFRC used usury laws as
incentive for ethical conduct and transparency on the part of MFIs.7 °
Microlenders that did not register with an approved regulatory authority
would not qualify for the exemption, and would be forced to restrict
themselves to the usury rates.71 Any company found to have violated the
regulators' codes of ethics could be expelled from the registry and thereby
disqualified from the exemption.7
61 See generally PATRICK MEAGER, MICROFINANCE REGULATION IN SOUTH AFRICA (Apr.
2005), available at http://www.microfinancegateway.com/content/article/detail/25525






67 See generally MEAGER, supra note 61.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Amanda Vermeulen, State Acts to Stamp Out Microlending Abuse, Bus. TIMES (S.
Aft.), May 16, 1999, at 1.
71 id.
72 Id.
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The problems did not end, however. MFRC research identified several
problems with existing credit legislation: 1) it provided ineffective
consumer protection, particularly for low-income groups; 2) access to credit
was constricted, especially for small and micro businesses; 3) credit costs
were high; and 4) some credit providers engaged in reckless behavior.73
Further research also discovered undesirable practices by micro-credit
intermediaries, debt collectors and debt administrators.74
B. National Credit Act of 2005
In 2005, the South African government passed the National Credit Act
("the Act"), which officially repealed both the Usury Law of 1968 and the
Usury Law Exemption of 1992. 75 Although the Act was passed in March
2005, it did not go into force until June 2007. Gabriel Davel, head of the
MFRC, said the Act is "consistent in its application, transparent, and shifts
rights to the consumer".
76
The result of numerous studies on microfinance in the specific South
African context, the Act clearly meets Accion's first recommendation that a
government should consider the unique microfinance environment that
currently exists within their own country. Shawn Barnett, a director at a
commercial law firm Deneys Reitz, said "[tlhe act has its origins in the
long-held belief by various market participants that [South Africa's]





For example, South Africa's history "clearly demonstrates the need for
public transparency on pricing. 78 According to a 2003 study,
[t]he average charge for mortgages and pension backed loans [is]
between 15-19% per annum compared to the average cost of small
short-term micro-loans, which cost consumers around 222-360% per
annum. In general, low-income consumers pay the highest rates for
credit with the shortest maturity, unless they have access to security
79such as property, pensions or insurance policies ....





77 Sanchia Temkin, New Law to Help Consumers Avoid the Debt Trap, Bus. DAY (S.
Afr.), May 2, 2006.
78 David Cracknell & Hermann Messan, The Art and Science of Pricing Financial
Services, MICROSAVE, Oct. 2006, at 12, available at http://www.microsave.org/getfilef.asp?
downloadid=2722.
79 Id. (citing PENNY HAWKINS, THE COST, VOLUME AND ALLOCATION OF CONSUMER
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In response, the National Credit Act and supporting legislation have
implemented "truth in lending laws" that require pricing transparency, to be
achieved, in part, by way of such means as the publication of effective
rates .8  Such transparency will be monitored and regulated by the National
Credit Regulator.8 ' The Act, which went into effect on June 1, 2007, also
addresses most of the other concerns expressed in the previous sections, to
be discussed below.
1. Aims of the Act and the NCR
The Act enjoys stable, high-level political support, having been signed
by President Mbeke in March of 2005. According to Trade and Industry
Minister Mandisi Mpahlwa, the purpose of the National Credit Act is "to
promote a credit market that is fair, transparent, accessible and responsible.
It also aims to promote a market that is competitive and sustainable.... It
specifically prohibits practices such as reckless lending and automatic
increases in credit limits, and regulates interest and fees.
8 2
The Act creates the National Credit Regulator, a body whose purpose
is to promote development of an accessible credit market.8 3 The NCR is
required to "promote and support the development, where the need exists,
of a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient,
effective and accessible credit market and industry to serve the needs of'
historically disadvantaged persons,84  low income persons and
communities, 8 5 and remote, isolated or low density populations and
communities, "in a manner consistent with the purposes of this Act. 8 6
Thus, the Act aims to shift the protected class back from the urban
employed to the truly marginalized populations.
In sum, the promoters of the Act display an awareness of the benefits
and possible failures both of supervisory and regulatory mechanisms and of
interest rate ceilings therein. The Act addresses the concerns discussed in
Parts I and II, and seeks an efficient integration of regulation, protection,
and free market capitalism.
2. Different Maximum Rates of Interest
The Act requires that the Department of Trade and Industry create
CREDIT IN SOUTH AFRICA, FEASIBILITY(PTY) LTD (2003)).
80 Id.; see generally National Credit Act 34 of 2005 (S. Afr.), available at http://www.cba
.co.za/IMAGES/NATIONALCREDIT ACT.pdf [hereinafter "National Credit Act"].
81 National Credit Act, supra note 80, at s. 13.
82 Themba Gadebe, Ban, ALLAFRICA, June 1, 2006 [hereinafter Ban].
83 See generally National Credit Act, supra note 80.
84 Id. at s. 13(a)(i).
85 Id. at s. 13(a)(ii).
86 Id. at s. 13(a)(iii).
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maximum rates of interest.8 7  In determining these caps, however, the
Ministry of Trade and Finance, in consultation with the National Credit
Regulators (described below), is required to set a different maximum rate of
interest, as well as maximum fees, for each subsector of the credit market.8
This requirement could address what seems to be one of the main
concerns of usury laws in microfinance, namely, the MFIs' inability to
compete with larger banks because of their higher operational costs, since
theoretically the Minister could create higher ceilings for registered MFIs
than for commercial banks. By doing so, the playing field could be leveled
enough to allow the MFIs to remain in business while still ensuring a non-
usurious rate of interest for the consumers.
Under the Act, the prescribed limits must take into account the "need
to make credit available" to historically disadvantaged persons, low-income
persons and communities, and remote, isolated or low density populations
and communities.8 9 The Act further requires the consideration of other
factors such as the conditions prevailing in the credit market, including the
cost of credit and the optimal functioning of the consumer credit market, as
well as the social impact on low income consumers. 90
3. Rates Will Be Set by Credit Experts
Under the National Credit Act, the interest rate ceilings will not be
created arbitrarily by politicians or judges. Instead, the Act adheres to
Accion's suggestions that a government engage in a consultative process
with a variety of financial experts and industry participants. In determining
the appropriate caps for each subsector, the Minister must consult with the
National Credit Regulators ("NCR") before setting these limits. 9' The NCR
is composed of economic experts, and is headed by qualified Chartered
Accountant Gabriel Davel as Chief Executive Officer.
92
Furthermore, the Act requires the NCR itself to monitor and research
any matter relating to the credit industry including "credit availability, price
and market conditions, conduct and trends, 93 as well as competition within
the consumer credit industry94 and access to consumer credit by small
businesses or disadvantaged persons.95
In an attempt to increase feelings of public ownership over the Act, the
87 Id. at s. 105.
88 Id. at s. 105(3)(a).
89 National Credit Act, supra note 80, at s. 13(a).
9' Id. at s. 105(2).
9' Id. at s. 105(1).
92 Ban, supra note 82.
93 National Credit Act, supra note 80, at s. 13(c)(i).
94 Id. at s. 13(c)(ii).
95 Id. at s. 13(c)(iii).
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South African government has reached beyond the major financial experts
for consultation in creating the specific regulations within the Act. The
government published a draft of the regulations in the National Credit Act
in September 2006.96 The regulations were then open for public comment
until the deadline of October 27, 2006.97 Groups such as the African
National Congress ("ANC") Youth League were encouraged to present the
National Credit Regulator with a list of concerns regarding various
provisions and policies within the Act, such as the possibility for an
"amnesty" for people currently blacklisted by credit bureaus.98
Accommodating opinions of the public, as well as experts in the
microfinance sector, is a promising sign that the South African National
Credit Act will be able to make well-informed decisions based on a real
view of the situation on the ground, as opposed to mere academic or
political speculations.
4. Consumer Protection Laws
The Act further seeks to improve consumer protection within the credit
market, through both enforcement and consumer education. Gabriel Davel,
the new head of the National Credit Regulator, has said:
I believe that the regulator has a big role to play in bringing
transparency and honesty to the South African credit market .... Loan
agreements are frequently complex and difficult to understand, with many
of the fees and obligations hidden in the fine print. The vulnerability of
people who have become so used to being rejected by credit provider [sic]
is frequently exploited. 99
The Act creates a set of protections, including a standard of
overindebtedness and a prohibition on reckless lending.' °° The Act also
provides consumer protection laws that protect against usurious rates upon
default, which might be used to evade interest rate restrictions, to the
detriment of the consumer. For example, Section 103 of the Act states that
"the interest rate applicable to an amount in default or an overdue payment
under a credit agreement may not exceed the highest interest rate.'1°1
In addition to these provisions, the Act authorizes the regulator to
receive and investigate complaints, as well as to educate consumers of their
rights under the law.1°2 Since at the time of this comment, the Act only
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recently has gone into effect, the actual effectiveness of these provisions
remains to be determined.
5. Enforcement
The National Credit Regulator is required to enforce the provisions of
the Act through several mechanisms, including promoting informal
resolution of disputes between consumers and credit providers, receiving
complaints concerning alleged contraventions of the Act, monitoring the
consumer credit market and industry to ensure that prohibited conduct is
prevented or detected and prosecuted, and investigating and evaluating
alleged contraventions of the Act.
10 3
Part B of the Act provides for a National Consumer Tribunal that can
adjudicate claims and provide enforcement through the issuance of fines. 10 4
Upon receiving complaints, the National Credit Regulator may refer matters
to the Tribunal.10 5 According to the NCR, "[i]n addition to its powers to
adjudicate disputes directly, the Tribunal will have the authority to make a
consent order reflecting any resolution arrived at through an alternative
forum and/or issue a compliance notice."10 6 Furthermore, credit providers
and consumers who wish to appeal against decisions of the National Credit
Regulator may appeal to the Tribunal. 
07
The Tribunal has received some criticism regarding its constitutional
implications, in the belief that it would act as an informal court, neither civil
nor criminal.' 0 8 A senior magistrate from Pretoria, Franz von Reiche, told
parliamentary hearings in August 2005 that the bill required that the
Tribunal dealt with consumer matters in an "inquisitorial manner," while
South Africa's legal norm was that of an adversarial system.10 9
He further stated that the Tribunal, which he called a "draconian
kangaroo court," would impose criminal sanctions based on the balance of
probabilities, the test used in civil matters, and not on the principle of
reasonable doubt, as required in criminal matters. 10 These criticisms were
expected to be addressed by the Department of Trade and Industry, but it
may be premature to tell how such concerns are playing out such within the
Tribunal's actual jurisdiction.
103 National Credit Act, supra note 80, at s. 15.
104 See generally National Credit Act, supra note 80.
105 Id. at s. 15.
106 Tribunal, http://www.ncr.org.za/Tribunal.html (last visited May 1, 2008).
107 Id.
108 Wyndham Hartley, Magistrate Warns Against Debt Pitfalls in New National Credit
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6. Effect on Commercial Lending Institutions
The Act "aims to regulate all types of consumer credit, and the whole
range of formal-sector credit providers, from retailers to microlenders to
banks."' 1  It seems that other lending institutions, including large
commercial lenders, should not face major problems as a result, with the
proper preparation. First, although the Act repeals previous legislation, it
provides for a phasing-in period in which the old acts would remain in force
until the necessary infrastructure is in place to administer the new one. 12
Second, participants in the South African consumer credit market are
now required to review their credit practices and documentation to ensure
compliance with the Act.' 13 The Act sets out new parameters with regard to
assessing whether the granting of credit to a consumer is being made
recklessly. 1 4 Retailers are required to undertake extensive checks on the
state of a consumer's finances before offering credit. When processing
credit applications, retailers' staffs have to complete an exhaustive
"financial means" test, which includes establishing the frequency of an
applicant's income and his or her existing financial obligations." 5
Furthermore, these new obligations require retail credit controller training
and electronic cross-referencing with records kept by the National Credit
Bureau. 116
In anticipation of the Act's enforcement in 2007, many commercial
lenders were already preparing for their future duties. FirstRand, a large
commercial bank, admitted that the National Credit Act will pose further
challenges, as it will affect fees and pricing. 1 7 However, as of September
2006, the group had already taken steps to address many of these
challenges. 1 8 For example, it planned to securitize more of its assets,
which would take those assets off its balance sheet and potentially improve
its return on those assets. 19 According to Microsave, a microfinance
research group based in Nairobi, "while in the short term the costs of
compliance may in fact drive up prices as banks seek to maintain margins,
in the medium term the impact of improved transparency should continue to
exert a downward pressure on pricing." '120
Moreover, while the National Credit Act puts a ceiling on the interest
1 1" South Africa; Making Debt Good, AFR. NEWS, June 17, 2005.
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banks can charge, it also levels the playing field in the lower end of the
market, where loans under RI0,000 were previously not subject to the
Usury Act requirements.' 2' As stated before, this meant microlenders could
charge what they liked.12 2 FirstRand's CEO, Sizwe Nxasana, has stated that
under the National Credit Act, FirstRand will get a better foothold in this
market. 23 Therefore, even large commercial institutions will be able to
thrive under the National Credit Act as long as they anticipate changes
resulting from the Act's new regulations and requirements and make the
necessary adjustments ahead of time.
7. The South African Model as an Experiment for All of Africa
The success of the National Credit Act would have an effect not just
within South Africa's borders, but throughout the African continent as well.
Microfinance projects are occurring in many of Africa's countries, who see
the National Credit Act as an experiment worth scrutinizing. Cape Town
hosted an African Microfinance conference in August 2005 to discuss ways
of integrating microfinance into formal financial markets.124 Rashid Ahmed
of the MFRC stated that "[flor Africa to move forward with economic
development and poverty alleviation, it's essential that it has to progress
quickly with the integration and transformation of its microfinance
industry."'
' 25
Fortunately, since the mid-1990s, there has been significant change
from the parallel banking system-one for the poor and the other for the
better off-and operations in some countries, such as Kenya and Tanzania,
are undergoing institutional changes and entering the formal financial
sector. 126 For example, the Central Bank of Kenya has encouraged greater
transparency in all its forty-two branches by using the two national
newspapers, the Union and the Standard, to publish fees and charges on
common accounts, such as current accounts, business loans, and personal
loans. 
27
Nevertheless, according to Ahmed, microfinance in most African
countries is "still regarded as separate to the formal financial sector and
handled as such. Until an energetic and determined effort is made to
integrate microfinance into the formal banking systems, we'll always be
121 Tlaleane, supra note 117.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 South Africa; Microfinance Specialists to Debate Financial Market Integration,
AFRICA NEWS, Aug. 29, 2005.
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playing catch-up."12 8 The rest of Africa will be watching the reaction to the
National Credit Act by the various players in the industry, especially the
extent to which the government is able to both replace current disparate
credit laws with consistent, enforceable credit legislation and regulate debt
relief, standard marketing/advertising/disclosure practices, and credit
reporting. 1
29
8. Recent Results of the Act
The National Credit Act is still in its early stages, but its impact on
South Africa seems to be largely positive so far. An August 2007 report by
PricewaterhouseCoopers, issued just weeks after the Act went into effect,
estimated that revenue growth for South African banks in 2007 would range
between ten and thirty percent, while income growth was expected to rise
by as much as twenty-five percent per year for the next three years.
130
Microlending itself was expected to record fifty percent growth in 2007, but
the banks also recorded success in capital markets, mergers and
acquisitions, foreign exchange, property finance and brokerage.
131
According to the report, the regulatory environment fostered by recent
developments such as the Act "is now seen as the most important driver of
change" and that the "widely held view was that regulations would continue
to proliferate across the financial sector."'
132
As predicted, those banks that reacted early on to the Act's new
provisions have created an advantage over competitors who were not as
quick to implement the appropriate changes. Capitec Bank Holdings, which
provides entry-level services to the poor, has followed the shift in banking
that recognizes the potential in low-income clients. 133 Capitec has been
able to comply with the Act and still be sustainable by using technology to
keep its costs to a minimum, and has been able to extend its microlending
services to an estimated 336,000 new clients from August 2006 to August
2007.134 As a result of its extraordinary success, Capitec was ranked third
in South Africa's Top 100 companies chart. 1
35
African Bank Investments Limited ("Abil"), one of the dominant
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institutions in South Africa's microlending business, made it a point to
adopt many of the Act's provisions early on. 136 As a result, its quarterly
results to June 30, 2007 showed it was set to weather introduction of the
Act with ease. 137 During the first month of operation under the Act, sales of
new loans were twenty-nine percent higher year on year, and Abil was able
to respond to a continued strong demand for credit without any
deterioration in credit quality.1
38
Clearly it remains to be seen what the long-term results of the Act will
be, but early results have been promising. The Act's recent enforcement
may mean that some institutions affected by the changes still suffer from a
lack of education or understanding of the Act's specific provisions, and thus
the success of banks and other commercial lenders could increase further
with greater familiarity as time goes on.
V. CONCLUSION
Microfinance's potential is well-documented. The question is how to
harness that potential within developing markets and sometimes
rudimentary institutions.
The goal of microfinance is to improve the access to credit for the
world's poorest communities, emphasizing the business skills of the
marginalized as opposed to their need for charity. Yet, to do this requires
more than an idealistic notion; it requires a thorough analysis of how to
balance that access with the profitability that provides the basis for any
successful business model.
Interest rate ceilings have been criticized by those who claim it
undermines that profitability within the microfinance sector by placing
MFIs at an unreasonable disadvantage to commercial banks with lower
operational costs. Critics claim that this situation encourages MFIs and
other similar NGOs to evade the caps by charging hidden fees or by
refusing to enter the microfinance sector altogether.
Yet, even those critics realize that predatory lending, based on
usuriously high interest rates, remains a substantial policy concern within
the microfinance world. Without regulations, lenders can charge, in the
name of viability, unreasonable rates that lead to overindebtedness and de
facto servitude for poor consumers. Thus, the very victims of microfinance
are the people it was intended to empower.
Some critics of usury laws have claimed that alternatives exist that can
reduce interest rates over time without setting official (and often arbitrary)
136 Richard Stovin-Bradford, Hedge Fund Managers Key to ABN Amro Sale, SUNDAY
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caps. For example, they claim that "[i]n many competitive markets,
efficiency has improved and microcredit interest rates have declined."'1
39
Creating a competitive market, however, takes time, stability and a level of
internal development that may not be present in a developing country.
As a result, abandoning usury laws altogether during the creation of a
microfinance sector is not a practically appropriate solution. Instead, they
should be accommodated within a supervisory and regulatory mechanism
which can account for market conditions and manually place microfinance
institutions back in a position where they can sustain viability in
competition with commercial lenders.
Following a nearly forty-year history of legislative attempts to regulate
interest rates, South Africa's government passed the National Credit Act of
2005. This Act provides a promising example of a supervisory and
regulatory mechanism which, if successful, can be used as a model from
which other nations may base their own custom-made model.
The Act provides for a mechanism that is tailored specifically to South
Africa's microfinance needs, rather than simply lifting the model of another
country. In creating such a mechanism, the creators of the Act, as well as
the leaders of the Act's supervisory institution, the NCR, engaged in "a
consultative process to arrive at a well-designed system that provides the
basis for growth and development of a healthy industry."'
140
The Act further benefits from a "suitable" political and microfinance
climate. Microfinance providers have existed for several years, under
various legislative regulations. As stated previously, although the Act was
passed in March 2005, it only went into force in June 2007, and the time
period between both dates was designated as a "phasing-in" period to allow
existing businesses from various sectors to transition successfully from the
old regulations to the new ones. 141 Moreover, the members of the NCR are
all experts in either banking, law, or economics, and the Act enjoys stable,
high-level political support from everyone from its Minister of Trade and
Industry to President Mbeke.
As discussed before, the Act requires that the Minister and the NCR
take into account several important factors in setting the interest rate limits
for each subsector, such as the current market conditions, the aims of the
Act, and the concerns of market participants across the spectrum.
Drawing from the research and analysis of other organizations
discussed earlier in this comment, there are several other factors that the
Minister and the NCR should specifically take into account when setting
these caps. For example, "as in all commercial structure," market viability
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requires that the interest rate be calculated with a view to at least cover the
costs of the institution, including administrative expenses, costs of funds,
and the cost of loan losses. 142  These costs can vary from country to
country, or even from institution to institution, so the Ministry needs to
focus on the environment in which the microfinance institutions provide
their services. 1
43
Additionally, the NCR and the Tribunal should be reasonable with the
non-compliance penalties that they enforce. While penalties are obviously
important for the effectiveness and credibility of the act, the regulating
institutions should keep in mind that their role should be less about
punishment and more about enabling these institutions to increase their
efficiency in the long run.
144
Finally, the interest rate ceilings are exactly that-ceilings. If the
critics of usury laws are correct, the regulations currently set may become
irrelevant if MFIs and commercial banks use competition as a means of
continually lowering their own interest rates. However, at that point, there
should be no argument for the detrimental effects of such ceilings.
In sum, South Africa's new model has the potential to prove that usury
laws can be effective if they are regulated in a supportive and reasonable
mechanism. If the Act continues to be successful, it could enhance
significantly the world's attempts to find that balance between idealistic
attempts to end poverty and the forces of business.
142 Microfinance Matters-Voices of Microfinance, http://www.uncdf.org/english/
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